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Abstract	
The	UK	Government	has	recently	announced	a	new	Counter‐Terrorism	and	Security	Act	2015	
to	facilitate	tackling	the	threat	of	violent	extremism.	In	light	of	this	and	previous	initiatives,	
this	 paper	 provides	 a	 critical	 assessment	 of	 UK	 counterterrorism	 policy.	 This	 policy	 has	
created	 a	 notion	 of	 ‘suspect	 communities’	 such	 that	 it	 has	 alienated	 young	Muslims	 at	 the	
community	engagement	 level,	 conceivably	and	empirically,	potentially	 further	exacerbating	
concerns	government	and	communities	have	over	questions	of	radicalisation,	extremism,	and	
the	associated	political	and	criminal	violence.	This	paper	argues	that	such	policies	can	lead	to	
the	institutionalisation	of	Islamophobia,	acting	as	an	echo	chamber	for	far	right	extremism	to	
flourish.	Significant	gaps	in	government	policy	in	this	area	can	only	be	addressed	by	fostering	
effective	 relations	 between	 communities	 and	 policy	 makers,	 with	 enablers	 such	 as	 police	
officers,	 youth	 workers,	 activists	 and	 faith	 leaders	 empowered	 to	 formulate	 nuanced	
approaches	 in	 various	 local	 area	 settings.	 Given	 the	 social,	 cultural	 and	 political	 situation	
regarding	British	Muslim	youth,	 including	those	presently	thought	to	be	fighting	in	parts	of	
Iraq	and	Syria,	as	well	as	ongoing	threats	on	UK	soil	presented	as	imminent	and	dangerous	by	
UK	government,	there	remain	acute	challenges	with	limited	opportunities.	
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Introduction	
Since	the	events	of	9/11	in	the	USA	and,	four	years	later	in	2005,	the	London	bombings	in	the	
UK,	 known	 as	 7/7,	 issues	 relating	 to	 terrorism,	 radicalisation,	 extremism	and	 its	 relationship	
with	British	Muslim	youth	have	 received	 abundant	 attention.	Recent	 events	 in	 Iraq	 and	 Syria	
have	led	to	a	new	UK	Counter	Terrorism	and	Security	Act	2015.	It	aims	to	give	the	police	and	the	
state	 broader	 powers	 to	 expand	 its	 counter‐terrorism	 strategy,	 including	 the	 controversial	
Prevent	 (preventing	 violent	 extremism)	 policy.	 Considerable	 emphasis	 is	 placed	 upon	 the	
notion	 that	 counterterrorism	 measures	 ought	 to	 focus	 on	 de‐radicalisation,	 such	 that	 the	
religion	 of	 Islam	 has	 been	 seen	 as	 the	 specific	 problem.	 Many	 centre‐left	 groups,	 scholars,	
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activists	 and	 writers	 have	 encouraged	 consideration	 of	 wider	 issues,	 but	 policymakers	 have	
discounted	the	importance	of	concerns	relating	to	foreign	policy,	domestic	integration	issues	or	
structural	disadvantage.		
	
These	concerns	are	potentially	heightened	by	the	UK	Government’s	new	Counter	Terrorism	and	
Security	Act	2015,	which	aims	to	curtail	free	speech	on	university	campuses	and	introduce	new	
legal	powers	to	 limit	wider	 freedoms.	 It	could	mean	nursery	school	staff	and	registered	child‐
minders	potentially	having	 to	 report	on	young	children	who	 they	 regard	as	being	radicalised.	
Furthermore,	 such	policies	will	 affect	Muslims	not	only	at	a	 cultural	 level	but	 also	at	 societal,	
institutional,	 legal	and	organisational	 level.	 It	also	affects	 the	 level	of	UK	government	rhetoric	
and	policy.	All	of	these	anxieties	suggest	that	significant	issues	continue	unchallenged	with	few	
clear	directions	for	empowering	British	Muslims	to	become	resilient,	internally	–	through	what	
communities	must	do	 –	 and	externally	 –	 that	 is,	 the	 role	 of	 society.	Meanwhile,	 Islamophobia	
and	 xenophobia,	 as	 a	 result	 of	 government	 policy,	 is	 potentially	 further	 intensified	 (Alibhai	
2014).	In	June	2015,	British	Prime	Minister	David	Cameron	spoke	at	the	Globsec	conference	in	
Bratislava.	He	argued	that	Muslim	communities	were	not	doing	enough	 to	combat	 the	 Islamic	
State	narrative	of	extremism.	He	stated	that:	‘Too	often	we	hear	the	argument	that	radicalisation	
is	the	fault	of	someone	else.	That	blame	game	is	wrong	–	and	it	is	dangerous.	By	accepting	the	
finger‐pointing	 –	 whether	 it’s	 at	 agencies	 or	 authorities	 –	 we	 are	 ignoring	 the	 fact	 that	 the	
radicalisation	starts	with	the	individual’	(Wintour	2015).	This	was	the	second	time	he	has	made	
a	major	speech	about	British	Muslims	and	extremism,	on	each	occasion	far	from	home.	By	doing	
so,	David	Cameron	exacerbates	the	narrative	of	 ‘othering’	Muslim	communities.	We	argue	that	
this	 disengages	 Muslim	 communities	 from	 active	 political	 discourse	 and	 helps	 fuel	 further	
animosity	and	radical	ideas.		
	
We	contend	that	institutional	levels	of	Islamophobia	have	come	to	the	fore	through	policies	that	
have	seemingly	targeted	Muslim	communities	more	so	than	any	other	religious	group.	Though	
much	 of	 the	 literature	 surrounding	 counterterrorism	 policies	 discusses	 flaws	 with	 such	
measures,	 this	 paper	 makes	 an	 original	 contribution	 by	 examining	 how	 Prevent	 has	
inadvertently	 created	 a	 climate	 of	 Islamophobia	 and	 hate.	 Further,	 we	 emphasise	 that	 it	 is	
imperative	for	any	new	counter‐terrorism	policy	to	be	measured,	balanced	and	proportionate.	
Thus,	this	paper	is	an	attempt	to	conceptualise	the	nature	of	UK	counterterrorism	policy	and	its	
implications	 for	 community	 cohesion,	 social	 integration	 and	 issues	 related	 to	 multicultural	
policy	and	practice.	First,	the	notion	of	‘suspect	communities’	is	analysed	and	interpreted	in	the	
context	 of	 British	 Muslims.	 Second,	 UK	 counterterrorism	 policy,	 in	 particular	 Prevent,	 is	
examined	 from	a	 similar	perspective.	Third,	 the	murder	of	 Lee	Rigby	 in	Woolwich	 in	2013	 is	
explored	with	regards	to	its	impact	on	British	Muslim	community	relations	and	issues	of	violent	
extremism.	Fourth,	 the	 changing	nature	of	 policing	 as	 an	 aspect	 of	 counterterrorism	policy	 is	
contextualised	 and	 implications	drawn	 in	 relation	 to	 its	methodology	 and	effectiveness.	 Fifth,	
the	 ways	 in	 which	 Prevent	 can	 be	 reconfigured	 in	 the	 light	 of	 ongoing	 issues	 in	 relation	 to	
extremism	is	discussed	with	policy	suggestions	put	forward.	In	conclusion,	we	argue	that	there	
are	severe	limitations	to	UK	counterterrorism	policy,	some	of	which	have	the	potential	to	make	
matters	worse	due	to	a	focus	on	religion	and	culture	rather	than	focusing	on	social	structure	or	
the	lack	of	agency	as	the	main	concern	(Klausen	2009).	Furthermore,	there	are	issues	of	cultural	
racism	 that	 are	 seemingly	 embedded	 in	 society	 as	 patterns	 of	 Islamophobia,	 xenophobia	 and	
racism	continue	to	take	hold.		
	
A	suspect	community	
Until	 the	 recent	 acts	 of	 terrorism	 in	 the	 USA	 and	 across	Western	 Europe,	 Irish	 groups	were	
considered	a	‘suspect’	community	in	the	UK	(Hillyard	1993).	The	Birmingham	pub	bombings	of	
1974	 led	 to	 the	 UK	 Parliament	 introducing	 draconian	 anti‐terrorist	 legislation	 with	 specific	
powers	handed	 to	 the	police,	 security	and	 intelligence	services,	 setting	 it	apart	 from	previous	
anti‐terrorist	 law.	 Historically,	 a	 dual	 system	 of	 justice	was	 engineered	where	 the	 legislation	
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created	one	set	of	laws	for	the	Irish	and	another	for	the	rest	of	society.	However,	the	legislation	
effectively	further	radicalised	the	Irish	community,	prolonging	a	political	solution	to	the	conflict.	
Whereas	these	earlier	counter‐terrorism	laws	focused	on	domestic	terrorism,	following	the	rise	
in	 threats	 posed	 by	 groups	 such	 as	 Al‐Qaida,	 the	 new	 counter‐terrorism	 laws	 endeavour	 to	
tackle	 the	 international	 threat.	 In	 similar	 vein	 to	 the	 Irish	 circumstances,	 the	 British	Muslim	
community	today	faces	a	relentless	assault	from	politicians	and	media	actors	who	concentrate	
on	the	seemingly	problematic	characteristics	of	Islam	and	Muslim	culture.	A	growing	volume	of	
anecdotal	evidence	demonstrating	that	the	UK	counterterrorism	framework,	which	centres	on	
communities	as	suspects,	 is	advertently	further	radicalising	young	Muslim	men.	Some	of	these	
young	men	have	now	 found	 themselves	 in	 theatres	of	war	as	 far	 away	as	 Iraq	and	Syria,	 and	
there	are	purportedly	radicalised	young	men	engaging	 in	potential	plots	on	UK	soil.	Localised	
and	national	Islamophobia	causes	radicalisation,	which	causes	further	Islamophobia,	such	that	
it	becomes	a	vicious	circle	of	agony,	intolerance	and	zealous	behaviour	(Abbas	2012).	It	seems	
that,	at	the	time	of	writing,	the	UK	government’s	de‐radicalisation	strategy	has	not	delivered.	
	
The	 discourse	 on	matters	 relating	 to	 notions	 of	 suspect	 communities	 is	well‐established.	 But	
there	 are	 anxieties	 that	 it	 is	 somewhat	 overstated,	 lacking	 empirical	 base	 or	 ideological	
motivation	 in	 relation	 to	 British	Muslims	 today	 (Greer	 2010).	 Nevertheless,	 in	 spite	 of	 these	
worries,	 there	 are	 distinct	 issues	 that	 characterise	 the	 Muslim	 experience	 as	 one	 specific	 to	
Islamophobia,	 victimisation,	 ‘otherisation’	 and	 discrimination	 (McGhee	 2011).	 It	 is	 persistent	
and	unidirectional	and,	since	the	Northern	disturbances	in	England	in	July	2001,	which	began	as	
a	riot	and	turned	into	ethnic‐related	conflicts,	and	the	events	of	9/11	four	months	later	in	the	
USA,	 Muslims	 in	 Britain	 have	 been	 regarded	 as	 possessing	 distinctly	 cultural	 problems	 that	
separate	 their	 lives	 from	 the	 rest	 of	 society	 (Alam	 and	Husband	 2013).	 Furthermore,	 though	
extensive	evidence	suggests	that	Islamophobic	physical	and	symbolic	violence	against	Muslims	
is	on	the	rise,	Muslim	minorities	are	somewhat	reluctant	to	report	incidents	to	authorities	due	
to	 questions	 of	 trust,	 both	 of	 the	 authorities	 they	 report	 to	 and	 because	 they	 think	 their	
accounts,	 as	 they	 are	Muslims,	will	 not	 be	 taken	 as	 based	on	 fact	 (Awan	2012a).	 These	hate‐
crime	 incidents	 are	not	 only	physical	 assaults	 but	 also	 virtual	 offences	 in	 the	 shape	 of	 online	
attacks	against	individuals	and	groups	(Awan	2014;	Copsey	et	al.	2013).	For	the	most	part,	they	
involve	 gangs,	 with	 racist	 attacks	 often	 occurring	 in	 or	 close	 to	 highly	 concentrated	 Muslim	
populated	 areas.	Victims	 of	 physical	 assaults	 are	 usually	Muslim	men,	where	online	 anti‐hate	
crimes	 affect	 Muslim	 women	 more	 than	 men.	 Though	 most	 crimes	 are	 not	 specific	 to	 a	
particular	far	right	organisation,	there	are	instances	implicating	the	British	National	Party	or	the	
English	Defence	League	(EDL)	(Githens,‐Mazer	and	Lambert	2010).	
	
No	universal	 terminology	exists	 for	extremism,	which	according	to	the	UK	Government	 is	 the,	
‘vocal	or	active	opposition	to	fundamental	British	values,	including	democracy,	the	rule	of	law,	
individual	 liberty	 and	 mutual	 respect	 and	 tolerance	 of	 different	 faiths	 and	 beliefs’	 (HM	
Government	 2011:	 107).	 The	 concept	 of	 extremism	 and	 its	 vagueness	 reconnects	 to	 the	
conceptual	foundations	of	Islamophobia.	Unquestionably,	‘violent	extremism’	appears	central	in	
constructing	a	suspect	community,	or	embedding	institutional	racism	or	processes	of	othering,	
and	 these	 arguments	 have	 been	 explored	 extensively	 (Kundnani	 2014).	 The	 definition	 of	
extremism	also	calls	for	‘the	death	of	members	of	our	armed	forces,	whether	in	this	country	or	
overseas’	(HM	Government	2011:	107).	The	above	interpretation	is,	however,	vague	and	at	best	
lacks	 clarity,	 leading	 to	 a	 perception	 that	 government	 policy	 is	 shaped	 by	 a	more	 subjective	
criterion,	 which	 may	 in	 effect	 marginalise	 the	 Muslim	 community	(Lambert	 2011).	 Davies	
(2008)	argues	that	the	term	extremism	should	cover	a	wide	range	of	forms	and	should	not	be	
simply	 viewed	 as	 Islamist	 extremism.	 The	 UK	 Citizenship	 Survey	 in	 2010,	 run	 by	 a	 leading	
market	 research	 company	 IPSOS‐MORI	 on	 behalf	 of	 the	 Communities	 Analysis	 and	Migration	
Division	 within	 the	 UK	 government’s	 Department	 for	 Communities	 and	 Local	 Government	
(DCLG)	(from	April	2010	to	June	2010)	found	that	most	respondents	rejected	violent	extremism	
(Phillips,	Tse,	 Johnson	and	IPSOS‐MORI	2011).	The	survey	 is	used	as	an	evidence	base	 for	 the	
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work	 of	 DCLG,	 so	 as	 to	 better	 understand	 key	 issues	 such	 as	 community	 cohesion,	 civic	
engagement	and	matters	pertaining	to	race	and	faith	identity.		
	
The	Prevent	Agenda	and	its	discontents	
Since	the	introduction	of	the	UK	counter‐terrorism	(Contest)	strategy	in	2006,	the	focus	of	the	
government	 has	 been	 on	 countering	 extremist	 Islam	 (Spalek	 2010).	 Undoubtedly,	 Al‐Qaeda‐
inspired	extremism	and	the	current	 threats	posed	by	groups	such	as	 Islamic	State	 in	 Iraq	and	
Syria,	 demonstrate	 that	 ideological	 fanaticism	 is	 problematic	 and	 an	 essential	 issue	 to	 be	
addressed	by	the	UK	government	and	security	services.	The	narrative	used	by	militant	Islamist	
groups	such	as	Islamic	State	has	created	a	culture	of	‘them	and	us’,	through	which	these	groups	
are	able	to	exploit	the	idea	of	the	‘Islamic	state’	as	a	means	to	whip	up	fear	and	create	anarchy.	
As	a	result,	understanding	and	disengaging	people	from	violent	extremism,	in	whichever	form	it	
manifests	itself,	is	crucial.	Equally,	however,	the	risks	posed	by	such	groups	should	not	mean	the	
UK	government	 remains	naïve	 to	 the	dangers	 far‐right	groups	also	pose.	 It	 leads	 to	questions	
about	what	violent	extremism	actually	means	since	the	Prevent	policy	has	shifted	over	time	to	
also	 include	 and	 then	 expand	 upon	 the	 concept	 of	 non‐violent	 extremism.	 This	 seems	 to	 be	
present	in	current	government	thinking	in	relation	to	the	UK	Counter	Terrorism	and	Security	Act	
2015,	 but	 with	 the	 implications	 that	 targeting	 ideology	 may	 lead	 to	 casual	 forms	 of	
Islamophobia.		
	
The	focus	of	the	Contest	strategy	is	to	reduce	the	risk	from	international	terrorism;	it	has	four	
key	strands,	which	include	Prevent.	The	others	are	Pursue,	which	aims	to	stop	terrorist	attacks;	
Protect,	 which	 endeavours	 to	 strengthen	 and	 to	 protect	 the	 UK	 from	 a	 terrorist	 attack;	 and	
Prepare,	 which	 aims	 to	 mitigate	 the	 impact	 of	 a	 terrorist	 attack	 (HM	 Government	 2011).	
Prevent,	 which	 is	 seen	 as	 the	 ‘softer’	 approach	 in	 dealing	 with	 extremism,	 has	 three	 major	
themes:	integration;	‘community	cohesion’;	and	partnership	work	with	local	communities.	It	is	
important	to	note	that	there	has	been	a	shift	 in	the	way	that	Prevent	 is	 implemented.	Prevent	
was	 introduced	 in	2006‐2007	as	a	programme	 that	 included	 these	 three	 themes	but	 in	2010‐
2011,	 once	 the	 Conservative/Liberal	 Democratic	 coalition	 government	 under	 Prime	 Minister	
David	 Cameron	 took	 office,	 the	 remit	 of	 the	 programme	 changed	 to	 include	 only	 Channel	
interventions.	The	Channel	 initiative	 is	a	process	that	aims	to	provide	support	mechanisms	to	
individuals	who	may	be	at	risk	of	being	radicalised.	Furthermore,	it	involves	a	range	of	partners	
who	work	together	to	help	provide	those	support	services,	such	as	the	police,	local	authorities,	
social	services	and	youth	offender	management	groups.	Community	cohesion	and	 integration,	
which	were	activities	of	Prevent	undertaken	by	the	DCLG,	were	discontinued	because	DCLG	lost	
ownership	 of	 the	 strategy	 when	 Prevent	 became	 a	 policing	 strategy	 and	 therefore	 the	
responsibility	of	the	Home	Office,	a	ministerial	department	of	 the	UK	government	responsible	
for	immigration,	security,	and	law	and	order.		
	
After	 the	7/7	London	bombings	 in	Britain	 in	2005,	 the	UK	government	was	 forced	to	act	 in	a	
way	that	would	challenge	modern	terrorism	and	its	sophisticated	local	and	global	profiles,	but	
at	 the	 same	 time	 was	 proportionate	 and	 fair.	 However,	 many	 British	 Muslims	 became	 the	
victims	of	an	ostensibly	hard‐line	government	policy,	and	studies	over	time	have	continued	to	
show	that	Muslim	communities	view	Prevent	with	a	sense	of	suspicion,	fear	and	apprehension	
(Awan	 and	 Blakemore	 2013).	 For	 example,	 the	 Muslim	 Council	 of	 Britain	 (2010)	 found	
that	Muslim	communities	felt	they	were	being	victimised	by	law	enforcement	agencies	and	were	
uneasy	 about	 counter‐terrorism	 legislation	 overall.	 The	 Hickman	 et	 al.	 (2011)	 study	 showed	
that	 Muslim	 communities	 were	 suspicious	 and	 in	 fear	 of	 counter‐terrorism	 policies	 and	
agencies	which	had	resulted	in	their	feeling	stigmatised.	Choudhury	and	Fenwick’s	(2011)	study	
into	 counter‐terrorism	 policies	 also	 found	 that	 Muslim	 communities	 felt	 stigmatised	 and	
isolated	because	of	the	anti‐terror	legislation	and	policies.		
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The	 UK	 government	 vision	 for	 Prevent	 policy	 has	 been	 based	 on	 the	 desire	 to	 create	 an	
institution	of	communities	which	would	contribute	to	British	society	in	positive	ways	and	at	the	
same	time	reduce	the	risk	of	home‐grown	extremism.	This	was	a	process	the	previous	British	
Prime	Minister,	the	Labour	Party’s	Gordon	Brown,	argued	would	encourage	changes	in	thinking	
as	 it	was	based	on	 the	principle	of	 ‘winning	hearts	and	minds’,	a	continuation	of	New	Labour	
rhetoric	of	the	time.	In	spite	of	this,	one	of	the	major	flaws	with	previous	Prevent	policy	was	its	
lack	 of	 critical	 detail	 on	 far	 right	 groups	 and	 lone	 wolf	 extremists.	 Although	 the	 coalition	
government	Prime	Minister	David	Cameron’s	speech	on	extremism	in	Munich	in	February	2011	
was	also	aimed	at	addressing	 this	wider	 threat,	 it	 failed	 to	develop	any	cogent	and	consistent	
policy	surrounding	far	right	extremist	groups.		
	
It	 is	clear	 that	 the	Prevent	policy	may	have	specific	shortcomings	that	are	deeply	problematic	
for	British	Muslim	communities,	but	parts	of	British	society	 firmly	believe	that	such	measures	
are	 necessary	 in	 order	 to	 keep	 them	 safe,	 such	 has	 been	 the	 political	 weight	 and	 cultural	
emphasis	 placed	 on	 the	 topic	 of	 British	 Muslim	 radicalisation	 (Vertigans	 2010).	 After	 the	
Conservative	 party	 returned	 to	 power	 by	 winning	 the	 majority	 vote	 in	 the	 2015	 General	
Election,	in	many	senses,	the	authoritarian	stance	taken	by	David	Cameron’s	British	government	
has	 the	 same	 outcomes	 as	 the	 ‘clash	 of	 civilisations’	 thesis	 propounded	 by	 various	
neoconservative	thinkers.	As	the	British	government	attempts	to	introduce	legislation	to	weed	
out	radicalised	Muslim	young	men	from	potentially	committing	acts	of	terrorism	on	home	soil,	it	
conceivably	 leads	 to	 destruction	 values	 of	 equality,	 liberty,	 fraternity	 and	 security	 that	 have	
established	nations	such	as	modern	Britain	in	the	eyes	of	the	many	(Moosavi	2013).	Moreover,	
it	alienates	an	already	beleaguered	population	 facing	a	 range	of	 internal	 challenges	as	well	as	
external	 limitations,	 such	 that	 ‘[p]olicies	 like	 indefinite	 and	 extended	 pre‐charge	 detention,	
deportation,	 weakened	 standards	 on	 torture,	 new	 speech	 offences	 and	 ill‐treatment	 have	
harmed	race	and	community	relations	and	diminished	the	prospects	of	Muslims	being	willing	to	
cooperate	with	police	and	security	services’	(Vertigans	2010:	32).	
	
The	 British	Muslim	 community	 is	 ethnically	 and	 culturally	 diverse,	 and	 possesses	 a	 range	 of	
sectarian	points	of	view.	There	are	also	class	differences,	which	are	a	function	of	pre‐migration	
factors	as	well	as	the	nature	of	the	lived	experience	in	various	local	area	contexts	(Abbas	2005).	
Thus,	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 different	 Muslim	 communities	 have	 been	 affected	 by	 a	 focus	 on	
counterterrorism	needs	to	be	understood.	Many	of	the	British	Muslims	implicated	in	terrorism	
herald	 from	 inner‐city	 areas	 in	 post‐industrial	 towns	 and	 from	 cities	 that	 have	 experienced	
severe	 structural	 disadvantage	 and	 racial	 discrimination.	 When	 asking	 young	 people	 and	
community	 elders	 about	 significant	 factors	 that	might	 cause	 radicalisation,	 an	 overwhelming	
number	of	responses	identified	socio‐economic	and	structural	influences	in	nature	and	design,	
and	 as	 such	 the	 solutions	 rest	 at	 these	 levels	 too	 (Abbas	 and	 Siddique	 2012).	 Moreover,	 by	
focusing	 on	 Muslims,	 government	 policy	 draws	 attention	 not	 to	 their	 socio‐economic	
disadvantage	 but	 to	 their	 cultural	 and	 religious	 norms	 and	 values.	 UK	 government	 policy	 is	
detrimentally	 impacting	 on	 community	 relations	 and	 negatively	 affecting	 the	 perceptions	 of	
British	 Muslims	 towards	 government	 institutions	 and	 foreign	 policy.	 Ongoing	 patterns	 of	
victimisation	have	led	to	feelings	of	alienation	and	isolation	among	British	Muslims,	impacting	
directly	on	the	risks	that	they	experience	(Mythen	et	al.	2009).	
	
The	initiation	of	the	Prevent	strand	of	government	antiterrorism	policy	enacted	in	the	wake	of	
the	 events	 of	 7/7	 has	 resulted	 in	 other	 significant	 problems	 faced	 by	 the	 British	 Muslim	
community.	These	relate	to	ongoing	patterns	of	otherisation	and	demonisation	that	marginalise	
and	 isolate	British	Muslims	 (Bonino	2013).	Repeatedly,	Muslims	 are	 characterised	as	 a	 single	
entity,	 undifferentiated	 or	 lacking	 nuance,	 where	 internal	 challenges	 within	 the	 Muslim	
community,	 which	 shape	 and	 pull	 it	 in	 a	 multitude	 of	 directions,	 and	 where	 certain	
opportunities	are	realised	while	others	remain	contested,	go	unrecognised	(Afshar	2013).	This	
attitude	has	been	reflected	in	various	speeches	made	by	British	politicians,	particularly	during	
the	period	2001	to	2007,	following	the	events	of	9/11	and	for	some	time	after	the	events	of	7/7.	
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The	use	of	 surveillance	cameras	 in	concentrated	population	areas	(Awan	2012b),	extra	police	
powers	 to	 question	 persons	 without	 charge	 and	 detain	 for	 extensive	 periods,	 and	 security	
checks	at	airports	and	other	places	of	transfer	alienate	Muslim	groups,	disenchanting	them	from	
integration	 in	 wider	 society	 and	 further	 intensifying	 the	 cycle	 of	 Islamophobia	 and	
radicalisation	 (Choudhury	 and	 Fenwick	 2011).	 Such	 broad‐brush	 policy	 initiatives	 ignore	 the	
sensitive	local	area	dynamics	that	are	often	at	play	within	various	ethnic	and	religious	minority	
communities	(Isakjee	and	Allen	2013).	They	effectively	create	 further	problems	as	 the	British	
government	seeks	 to	promote	 the	notion	of	 ‘moderate’	Muslims	and	 ‘extremist’	Muslims,	 thus	
dividing	 the	Muslim	 community	 into	 those	who	are	 suspect	 and	 those	who	are	 thought	 to	be	
pro‐integration,	 and	 using	 the	 latter	 group	 to	 help	 justify	 government	 policy	 in	 this	 regard.	
Separating	 the	 two	enables	 the	 state	 to	 direct	 its	 activity	 at	 the	 extremists.	 Such	 categorising	
enforces	divisions;	however,	 the	shades	of	grey	between	different	Muslim	sensibilities	are	not	
well	 understood	 (O’Duffy	 2008).	 These	 complexities	 are	 the	 reason	 for	 many	 different	
approaches	taken	by	the	UK	government,	where	Sufi,	liberal	and	progressive	groups	as	well	as	
established	 Doebandi	 and	 Jamaaet‐e‐Islami	 ones	 have	 all	 had	 various	 associations	 with	
government,	particularly	during	the	New	Labour	era	(1997‐2010),	but	with	limited	degrees	of	
success	 (Bowen	 2014).	 Such	 processes	 had	 the	 effect	 of	 immunising	 certain	 Muslim	 groups	
because	of	the	partnership	language	used	by	government	policy	(Klausen	2009).	
	
A	 fundamental	 pillar	 in	 this	 process	 –	 trust	 between	 the	 policing	 services	 and	 Muslim	
communities	 (Spalek	2010)	–	 is	potentially	 lost,	 thereby	 threatening	 the	overall	 efforts	of	 the	
counterterrorism	 policy,	 both	 implicitly	 and	 explicitly.	 Moreover,	 the	 situation	 is	 further	
problematised	if	notions	of	‘values’	enter	into	the	discourse	because	this	implies	that	something	
is	 profoundly	 lacking	within	 certain	Muslim	 communities.	 This	potentially	 leads	 to	 additional	
stigmatisation	(Spalek	and	McDonald	2010).	A	normalisation	of	the	‘war	on	terror’	has	seeped	
into	the	public	imagination	and	popular	discourses	so	much	so	that	it	has	become	embedded	in	
the	 cultural	 fabric	 of	 society	 (Kundnani	 2014).	 A	 particular	 issue	 concerns	 engagement	 with	
British	 Muslim	 communities,	 and	 the	 significant	 gap	 that	 emerges	 between	 approach	 and	
outcome,	intention	and	result.	Research	continues	to	demonstrate	that	it	is	the	combination	of	
‘soft’	 community	 orientated	 processes	 and	 ‘hard’	 behind‐the‐scenes	 intelligence,	 security	 and	
policing	 measures	 which	 seems	 to	 produce	 the	 most	 effective	 results.	 This	 multi‐method	
approach	 also	 creates	 the	 conditions	 for	 confidence	 among	 those	 involved	 in	 the	 process	
(Spalek	and	 Imtoual	2007),	bringing	 to	 the	 fore	opportunities	 for	professional	youth	workers	
whose	 role	 is	 to	 work	 with	 disaffected	 young	 Muslim	 men	 experiencing	 challenges	 to	 their	
identities,	partly	as	a	result	of	government	policy	(McDonald	2011).		
	
Far	right	extremism	and	the	Woolwich	murder	
In	May	2013,	off‐duty	British	soldier	Lee	Rigby	was	murdered	in	an	unprovoked	attack	on	the	
streets	 of	Woolwich	 in	 south‐east	 London	by	Michael	Adebolajo	 and	Michael	Adebowale.	 The	
perpetrators	told	passers‐by	 that	 they	had	killed	a	soldier	 to	avenge	the	killing	of	Muslims	by	
the	British	armed	forces.	Both	men	have	since	been	jailed.	Adebolajo	is	serving	a	minimum	life	
sentence;	Adebowale	was	given	a	minimum	of	45	years	in	prison.		
	
Prevent	aims	to	promote	integration,	cohesion	and	community	safety	but	it	has	unsuccessfully	
tackled	 the	 wider	 issue	 of	 far	 right	 extremism	 and,	 instead,	 paved	 the	 way	 for	 anti‐Islamist	
groups	such	as	the	English	Defence	League	(EDL).	The	UK	Government	identifies	international	
terrorism	 and,	 in	 particular,	 Al‐Qaeda‐led	 extremism	 as	 a	major	 cause	 for	 concern	 in	 the	 UK	
(HM	Government	 2011).	However,	 the	policy	 lacks	 depth	 and	 substance	 regarding	 the	 threat	
from	far	right	extremist	ideologies.	Clearly,	some	far	right	extremist	groups	will	have	aims	and	
goals	that	differ	from	those	of	terrorists.	For	example,	groups	such	as	animal	rights	extremists,	
anti‐capitalist	extremisms,	anti‐abortionists	and	anti‐Semites	do	not	necessarily	have	the	same	
motives	as	terrorist	groups	and	as	a	result	have	never	really	been	a	focus	for	Prevent	(Hadley	
2009).	 Therefore,	 following	 the	 events	 in	 Woolwich	 in	 2013,	 Prevent	 has	 the	 potential	 to	
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marginalise	a	single	community,	and	exacerbate	a	tone	for	the	EDL	rhetoric	that	‘Islamism’	is	on	
the	 rise	 in	 Britain	 and	 should	 be	 combated	unless	 government	 policy	 indicates	 otherwise	
(Chakraborti	 and	 Garland	 2009).	 The	 case	 of	 Anders	 Breivik,	 the	Norway	 bomber,	 highlights	
how	 far	 right	 lone	 wolf	 extremists	 sometimes	 persist	 under	 the	 radar	 and	 why	 counter‐
extremism	 policies	 need	 to	 ensure	 they	 are	 modelled	 in	 a	 way	 that	 takes	 into	 account	 the	
serious	threats	they	pose	(Bangstad	2014).	In	Breivik’s	case,	his	1515	page	manifesto	entitled	A	
European	Declaration	of	Independence	(2011)	explains	how	the	Islamification	of	Europe	and	the	
dangers	of	 Shariah	Law	and	 Jihad	 are	 a	 threat	 to	 civilisation.	Using	 a	 variety	of	 references	 to	
justify	his	claims,	Breivik’s	manifesto	helps	throw	light	on	the	radical	narrative	that	helped	him	
gain	a	self‐perpetuated	credence	that	subsequently	led	him	to	murder	92	people.		
	
The	Tell	MAMA	(Measuring	Anti‐Muslim	Attacks)	UK	organisation	which	looks	at	tackling	and	
reporting	anti‐Muslim	hate	crimes	illustrated	that,	from	March	2012	to	March	2013,	74	per	cent	
of	 anti‐Muslim	 crimes	 were	 recorded	 online	 (Tell	 MAMA	 2013a).	 Other	 hate	 incidents	
included	attacks	against	mosques.	Some	mosques	have	had	graffiti	sprayed	across	their	walls,	
while	 others	 have	 been	 petrol‐bombed	 and	 vandalised.	 Assailants	 have	 ripped	 off	 Muslim	
women’s	 head	 scarves.	 Statistics	 show	 that	 online	 hate	 crimes	 against	 Muslims	 are	 on	 the	
increase	(Awan	and	Blakemore	2013).	For	example,	before	the	Woolwich	incident	there	was	an	
average	 of	 28	 anti‐Muslim	hate	 crimes	 per	month	 (in	April	 2013,	 there	were	 22	 anti‐Muslim	
hate	crimes	in	London	alone)	but	in	May,	the	month	Rigby	was	murdered,	that	number	soared	
to	109.	Between	May	2013	and	February	2014,	there	were	734	reported	cases	of	anti‐Islamic	
abuse	 and	 of	 these,	 599	 were	 incidents	 of	 online	 abuse	 and	 threats,	 while	 the	 others	 were	
‘offline’	 attacks	 such	 as	 violence,	 threats	 and	 assaults	 (Tell	MAMA	2013b).	 One	 such	 incident	
involved	 the	 Al	 Rahma	 community	 centre	 in	Muswell	 Hill	 in	 North	 London	which	was	 burnt	
down	following	the	Woolwich	murder.	More	recently,	a	bomb	was	 found	outside	a	mosque	 in	
Walsall	 (a	 large	 industrial	 town	 in	 the	West	Midlands	 of	 England)	which	was	 at	 full	 capacity	
during	Friday	prayers	(BBC	News	2013).	It	appears	far	right	extremist	groups	have	been	able	to	
gain	momentum	 and	 support	 relatively	 quickly.	 They	 have	 done	 so	 without	 attracting	much	
notice,	perhaps	in	part	because	the	mainstream	views	reported	from	politicians,	the	media	and	
law	 enforcement	 agencies	 have	 tended	 to	 focus	 on	 Islamist	 groups	 as	 the	 major	 threat	 to	
national	security	(Bartlett	et	al.	2011).	Far	right	groups	such	as	the	Progress	Party	in	Norway,	
the	Party	 for	Freedom	 in	Holland	 led	by	 the	Dutch	 far	 right	politician	Geert	Wilders,	 and	 the	
Freedom	Party	in	Austria	have	become	powerful	political	parties	in	Europe.	Moreover,	a	2011	
report	published	by	the	Domestic	 Intelligence	Agency	 in	Germany	found	that	over	767	people	
had	some	sort	of	affiliation	with	far	right	extremist	groups	(German	Intelligence	Report	2011).	
	
The	 UK	 government,	 however,	 argues	 there	 are	 only	 17	 people	 associated	 with	 far	 right	
extremism	(at	 the	 time	of	writing)	who	are	serving	sentences	 in	Britain	 for	 terrorist	offences.	
Such	 far	 right	 extremism	 is	 regarded	 as	 less	 of	 a	 threat	 than	 Al‐Qaida	 or	 similar	 Islamist	
terrorist	 groups.	 Moreover,	 the	 Prevent	 Agenda	 argues	 that	 people	 involved	 in	 far	 right	
extremism	do	not	have	the	same	training	as	those	involved	in	Islamist	extremism.	Specifically,	
the	Prevent	Agenda	(HM	Government	2011:	15)	states	that,	 ‘people	involved	in	extreme	right‐
wing	terrorism	have	not	received	the	same	training,	guidance	or	support	as	many	of	those	who	
have	 engaged	 with	 Al	 Qa’ida	 or	 Al	 Qa’ida‐influenced	 organisations’.	 Another	 UK	 government	
argument	 for	 far	 right	 extremism	 being	 a	 less	 significant	 threat	 than	 the	 Islamist	 threat	 is	
because	 the	 policy	 framework	 on	 far	 right	 extremist	 groups	 is	 not	 as	 well	 developed	 into	 a	
coherent	 strategy.	 The	 Prevent	 Agenda	 (HM	 Government	 2011:	 20)	 argues	 that,	 ‘[g]iven	 the	
small	 number	 of	 relevant	 cases	 (and	 the	 absence	 here	 of	 extreme	 right‐wing	 terrorist	
organisations	and	formal	groups)	our	understanding	of	how	people	become	involved	in	extreme	
right‐wing	 terrorism	 is	 inevitably	 less	 developed	 than	 it	 is	 for	 terrorism	 associated	 with	 Al	
Qa’ida’.	However,	the	Prevent	consultation	found	that	a	majority	(80%)	of	respondents	believed	
that	Prevent	should	address	the	wider	problems	of	far	right	extremism	(HM	Government	2011).	
Certainly,	 the	 far	 right	 and	 ‘lone	 wolf’	 extremist	 threat	 has	 intensified	 post‐Woolwich,	 as	 a	
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number	 of	 mosques	 have	 been	 targeted.	 Furthermore,	 the	 case	 of	 Mohammed	 Saleem,	 a	
grandfather	 from	 Birmingham	 (UK)	 murdered	 by	 a	 Ukrainian	 national	 staying	 in	 Britain	 in	
2013,	 raised	 concerns	about	 the	potential	 links	between	 far	 right	 extremist	groups	 in	Europe	
(Hall	2013).	
	
The	 government	 recognises	 the	 threat	 posed	 by	 Islamist	 terrorist	 groups	 and	 as	 such	 has	
banned	certain	 Islamist	organisations	which	promote	violence,	but	 critics	 argue	 that	 far	 right	
groups	 such	 as	 the	EDL	 (the	main	differences	 between	 these	 groups	 are	 their	 ideologies	 and	
motives)	are	still	operational.	Since	its	emergence,	the	EDL	has	staged	a	number	of	controversial	
demonstrations	against	Islam	and	Muslims.	They	aim	to	ignite	old	and	new	racial	stereotypes,	
and	exacerbate	the	conflict	between	Muslim	and	non‐Muslim	groups	in	Britain.	These	protests	
have	 intensified	 and	 increased	 in	 number	 following	 the	Woolwich	murder,	 with	 slick	 public	
relations	 campaigns	 aimed	 at	 capitalising	 on	 this	 incident.	 Many	 of	 these	 protests	 turned	
violent,	 with	 a	 number	 of	 EDL	 and	 opposition	members	 arrested	 for	 offences	 relating	 to	 the	
breach	of	the	peace.	Although	anti‐capitalist	protests	have	also	occurred	and	received	attention,	
the	 EDL	 marches	 have	 targeted	 mainly	 Muslim	 communities,	 with	 the	 express	 desire	 of	
changing	 the	 landscape	of	 the	 immigration	debate.	Unsurprisingly,	 the	EDL	has	been	quick	 to	
hold	these	protests	within	Muslim	communities	as	a	means	to	provoke	public	sentiment.	Case	
study	 research	 with	 young	 white	 working‐class	 men	 involved	 in	 the	 EDL	 found	 that	 socio‐
structural	 characteristics	 such	 as	 experiences	 of	 inequality	 and	 disenchantment	 generated	
psychological	rationalisations	to	justify	their	actions	(Treadwell	and	Garland	2011).	In	a	similar	
vein,	 pro‐Muslim	 groups,	 such	 as	the	 Muslim	 Defence	 League	 and	 Muslims	 against	 Crusade	
group,	have	emerged	in	the	UK.	They	have	both	held	counter‐demonstrations	against	the	EDL.	
Evidently,	counter‐terrorism	policies	in	this	remit	must	tackle	all	forms	of	threat,	and	not	those	
simply	confined	to	Islamist‐led	extremism.	Unfortunately,	far‐right	extremists	are	able	to	use	a	
‘them	versus	us’	narrative	to	create	a	sense	of	polarisation	which	feeds	further	into	anti‐Muslim	
hate	crime.	Therefore,	counter‐terrorism	must	help	root	out	violent	extremists,	but	it	must	not	
be	used	as	a	means	of	propagating	a	new	type	of	institutional	Islamophobia,	where	the	state	and	
those	applying	such	powers	use	it	to	disproportionately	target	Muslim	communities.		
	
Policing	Muslim	communities	
A	specific	problem	with	Prevent	policy	has	been	how	counter‐terrorism	policing	has	blurred	the	
lines	 within	 community	 policing	 models.	 However,	 the	 Prevent	 Agenda	 has	 a	 different	
explanation.	 HM	Government	 (2011:	 99)	 state,	 ‘We	 have	 seen	 no	 evidence	 that	Prevent	work	
has	 damaged	 police	 and	Muslim	 community	 relations.	We	 believe	 the	 evidence	 points	 in	 the	
opposite	direction’.	Although	the	Prevent	Agenda	does	not	acknowledge	problems	with	policing	
Muslim	communities,	 a	 case	 study	 reveals	 an	alternative	perspective.	In	2009,	West	Midlands	
Police	sent	counter‐terrorism	officers	to	visit	a	local	nursery	in	the	area	of	Birmingham	where	it	
was	 perceived	 children	 were	 being	 radicalised	(Casciani	 2009).	 It	 sparked	 a	 wide‐ranging	
debate	 among	 policymakers	 about	 the	 rationale	 of	 Prevent	 and	why	 and	 how	 children	were	
viewed	 as	 ‘suspects’	 vulnerable	 to	 terrorist	 indoctrination,	 recruitment	 and	
propaganda	(Frankel	and	Jones	2007).	The	importance	of	such	a	case	cannot	be	downplayed.	It	
reveals	 how	 a	 top‐down	 approach	 towards	 extremism	 can	 often	 lead	 to	 police	 officers	
developing	a	poor	understanding	of	cultural	sensitivities	and	community	police	work.	What	was	
problematic	in	this	instance	was	the	language	used.	An	email	from	one	of	the	officers	involved	
stated:	
	
I	 am	 a	 police	 officer	 and	 therefore	 it	 will	 always	 be	 part	 of	 my	 role	 to	 gather	
intelligence	 and	 I	 will	 report	 back	 any	 information	 or	 intelligence	 which	 may	
suggest	 someone	 is	 a	 terrorist,	 or	 is	planning	 to	be	one	or	 to	 support	others	…	
And	I	do	hope	that	you	will	tell	me	about	persons,	of	whatever	age,	you	think	may	
have	been	radicalised	or	be	vulnerable	to	radicalisation.	(cited	in	Casciani	2009)		
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The	 vernacular	 in	 this	 email	 raises	 severe	 questions	 about	 policing	 and	 community	 relations	
with	regards	to	tackling	extremism.	Since	the	early	1970s	and	1980s,	policing	of	minorities	has	
been	problematic,	with	tensions	over	policing	public	order	(Cain	1973;	Gordon	1984).	Evidence	
indicated	 uncompromising	 strategies	 with	 regards	 to	 minority	 communities	 were	 manifest	
because	 of	 extensive	 police	 autonomy	 (Graef	 1989;	 Holdaway	 1983).	Following	 the	 ‘war	 on	
terror’,	Muslim	communities	have	been	viewed	in	much	the	same	way	as	the	African‐Caribbean	
and	Irish	communities	were	treated	previously:	that	is,	as	a	‘suspect	group’.	The	UK	government	
has	 enacted	 considerable	 counter‐terrorism	 legislation,	 namely	 the	 Terrorism	 Act	 2000,	 the	
Prevention	of	Terrorism	Act	2005,	and	the	Terrorism	Act	2006,	which	has	given	the	police	wider	
powers	of	stop	and	search,	of	pre‐charge	detention,	and	to	curb	downloading	material	deemed	
to	 be	 useful	 for	 terrorist	 purposes.	 This	 legislation	 has	 been	 problematic	 for	 Muslim	
communities.	
	
Therefore,	any	new	Prevent	Agenda	must	ensure	that	Islam	and	Muslims	are	not	the	main	focus	
of	 Prevent	 as	 new	policy	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 ignite	more	 sympathisers	 to	 terrorist	 aims	 and	
goals	than	to	actually	deal	with	the	root	causes	of	extremism.	For	example,	as	noted	above,	the	
emergence	 of	 Prevent	 has	 caused	 a	 wave	 of	 controversy	 and	 its	 implementation	 has	 been	
accused	by	 its	 critics	as	 a	 form	of	 ‘spying’	upon	 the	Muslim	community.	The	 focus	of	Prevent	
must	be	 to	engage	with	communities	 in	 the	debate	about	violent	extremism,	by	working	with	
grass	 roots	 activists	 and	 with	 those	 who	 have	 direct	 experiences	 of	 radicalisation	 and	
extremism,	but	without	seemingly	co‐opting	groups	to	adhere	to	government	policy	rhetoric	in	
relation	 to	 integration,	 cohesion	 and	 Britishness.	 In	 doing	 so,	 Prevent	 must	 therefore	 also	
examine	 how	 far	 right	 groups	 use	 incidents	 such	 as	 the	 Woolwich	 murder	 to	 play	 upon	
disaffection,	anger	and	animosity.	This	can	be	extremely	dangerous	as	evidence	suggests	there	
has	been	a	rise	in	anti‐Muslim	hate	crime	in	recent	periods,	and	far‐right	groups	across	Europe	
and	 in	 the	 UK	 have	 used	 the	 incident	 to	 gather	 support	 and	 momentum	 (Thomas	 2012).	
However,	 Prevent	 has	 been	 tainted	 by	 a	 counter‐terrorist	 narrative	 which	 critics	 argue	 has	
abused	 the	 trust	 of	 some	 communities.	 The	 policy	 has	 also	 been	 translated	 into	 an	 approach	
that	attempts	to	enlist	Muslim	participants	as	‘agents’	for	the	state,	which	could	possibly	mean	
‘spying’	upon	their	neighbours,	family	and	friends	(Kundnani	2009).	Recent	research	on	Prevent	
with	participants	 from	the	Alum	Rock	area	in	Birmingham	found	that	 they	were	distrustful	of	
the	police,	government	and	security	services	with	regards	to	this	policy	(Awan	2012a).	
	
One	of	the	main	priorities	for	the	UK	government	following	the	Woolwich	murder	is	the	need	to	
re‐examine	Prevent.	Undeniably,	one	of	the	main	challenges	for	the	new	Government	Act	is	how	
to	change	the	damaged	reputation	and	image	of	the	Prevent	Agenda	which	has	been	deemed	a	
surveillance	mechanism	 that	 targets	Muslim	communities.	The	previous	Prevent	policy	under	
Gordon	Brown’s	New	Labour	government	revealed	serious	issues	of	poor	public	management	of	
funding	and	a	sense	that	Muslim	communities	were	angry	that	they	had	not	been	consulted	in	
the	 overall	 Prevent	 Agenda	 (Kundnani	 2009).	 Any	 new	 policy	 must	 comply	 with	 basic	
fundamental	 human	 rights,	 which	 means	 all	 communities,	 regardless	 of	 ethnicity,	 culture	 or	
religion,	have	a	right	to	freedom	of	expression	and	the	right	to	live	in	peace	despite	the	public	
outcry	that	Muslim	communities	should	do	more	to	 tackle	extremism	following	the	Woolwich	
murder.	 Strategies	 such	 as	 Prevent	 suffer	 from	 image	 crises,	 but	 what	 does	 more	 harm	 is	
inadvertently	 exacerbating	Muslims’	 perceptions	 that	 they	 are	 being	 unfairly	 targeted.	 Prime	
Minister	David	Cameron,	speaking	at	a	conference	in	Munich	on	issues	surrounding	security	and	
multiculturalism,	and	how	the	UK	monitors	and	counters	extremism	(Cameron	2011),	made	it	
clear	 that	 Muslim	 communities	 needed	 to	 do	 more	 to	 tackle	 extremism.	 However,	 a	 recent	
Home	Affairs	Select	Committee	report	examining	 the	root	causes	of	extremism	 found	that	 the	
UK	 government,	 expanding	 its	 Prevent	 portfolio	 with	 more	 projects	 aimed	 at	 tackling	
extremism,	needed	 to	 ensure	 that	Muslims	were	 treated	 fairly	 and	not	 seemingly	 targeted	by	
Prevent	policy	(Commons	Select	Committee	2011).	
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The	Woolwich	murder	 has	 shown	 that	 preventing	 extremism	 is	 an	 increasingly	 difficult	 and	
complex	 problem	 that	 does	 not	 have	 a	 simple	 solution.	 It	 requires	 a	 multi‐faceted	 approach	
from	 agencies	 that	 take	 into	 account	 the	 dangers	 from	 far	 right	 extremism,	 lone	 wolfs	 and	
Islamist	 threats.	 It	was	hoped	 that	 counter‐terrorism	policies	 such	 as	Prevent	would	 create	a	
more	 tolerant	 and	 cohesive	 community	 in	 Britain,	 not	 only	 tackling	 extremism	 but	 also	
promoting	 inter‐faith	 activity	 and	 a	 shared	 sense	 of	 belonging.	 Clearly,	 the	 2011	 Prevent	
Strategy	 is	 much	 stronger	 than	 previous	 Prevent	 initiatives;	 however,	 following	 Woolwich,	
policymakers	 have	 extremely	 difficult	 decisions	 to	 make.	 The	 UK	 government’s	 counter‐
terrorism	 legislation,	 counter‐terrorism	 policing	 and	 subsequent	 counter‐terrorism	 policies	
have	 led	 to	many	Muslims	 feeling	 a	 sense	 of	 victimisation	 and	 as	 such	 thinking	 that	 they	 are	
increasingly	viewed	as	a	‘suspect’	community.	Terrorist	attacks	are	a	concern,	but	an	Orwellian	
society	will	 only	 lead	 to	 further	 unnecessary	 powers	 being	 given	 to	 the	 police	 and	 the	 state,	
whose	scope	is	already	broad	and	intrusive.	The	British	government	should	ensure	that	the	new	
Prevent	Agenda	does	not	imitate	the	old	one	in	new	clothes.	
	
Concluding	remarks	
The	issue	of	extremism	in	relation	to	Muslim	minorities	are	dominant	in	popular	discourses,	but	
it	 is	 also	 quite	 clear	 that	 patterns	 of	 racial	 disadvantage	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 colour	 persist.	
Islamophobia	has	become	a	recognised	phenomenon	for	South	Asian	Muslim	minorities,	namely	
Pakistanis	 and	Bangladeshis,	 but	direct	 and	 indirect	 forms	of	 racism	and	discrimination	have	
not	abated.	Material	needs	and	concerns	are	on	top	of	the	list	of	anxieties	that	face	young	British	
Muslims,	but	wider	questions	relating	to	Britishness,	diversity	and/or	multiculturalism	are	far	
removed	from	the	everyday	realities	facing	young	people	in	inner‐city	areas.	It	leads	to	dualism	
and	 binary	 opposites,	 which	 in	 reality	 are	 non‐existent	 as	 there	 are	many	 shades	 of	 grey	 in	
determining	notions	of	Britishness,	Muslimness	and	how	Islamophobia	is	articulated	in	practice	
(Mac	an	Ghaill	and	Haywood	2014).		
	
In	many	ways,	what	has	been	witnessed	in	this	so‐called	radicalisation	of	British‐born	Muslim	
youth	 is	 in	 fact	an	aspect	of	 the	coming	of	age	 in	 the	context	of	 intergenerational	change	and	
development.	 Conflation	 between	 structural	 and	 cultural	 issues	 emerges	 when	 exploring	 the	
factors	that	determine	radicalisation,	and	extremism	is	often	thought	to	lie	within	the	religion	
and	cultural	characteristics	of	the	community	of	 interest.	However,	thinking	also	suggests	that	
aspirations	may	exist	at	a	more	interpersonal,	sociological	and	psychological	level	where	these	
young	men	are	in	fact	reconfiguring	notions	of	what	it	is	to	be	British	rather	than	rejecting	it.	It	
is	 because	 of	 this	 sense	 of	 Britishness	 that	 they	 are	 regarded	 as	 radicals,	 not	 because	 of	 its	
rejection	altogether	(Lynch	2013).	As	such,	these	radicals	are	made	in	Britain	and	are	a	function	
of	 the	 lived	 experience	of	 the	British	 context,	 further	 emphasising	 a	 political	 and	 sociological	
understanding	of	the	concept	rather	than	one	rooted	in	religion	or	forms	of	cultural	behaviour	
associated	with	ethnicity	(Abbas	2011).	Regrettably,	the	new	Counter‐Terrorism	and	Security	Act	
2015	is	likely	to	place	further	restrictions	on	free	speech	and	reproduce	the	suspect	community	
climate.	British	universities,	rather	than	being	a	hotbed	of	radicalisation	in	the	negative	sense,	
are	a	space	in	which	young	Muslims	find	opportunities	to	reconfigure,	reshape	and	refocus	their	
identity	politics	in	the	light	of	challenges	that	operate	at	a	wider	societal	level	(Brown	and	Saeed	
2014).	There	are	implications	for	Muslims	on	campus	should	the	new	measures	be	introduced.	
	
Undoubtedly,	young	people	desire	 the	need	 to	engage	with	 those	regarded	as	credible,	but	as	
government	continues	to	support	certain	organisations	and	policies	at	the	expense	of	others,	it	
has	 the	 potential	 to	 alienate	 young	Muslims	 further	 (cf.	 Spalek	 2011).	 Moreover,	 if	 any	 new	
policy	is	deemed	disproportionate,	a	real	risk	is	that	it	might	give	succour	to	those	who	regard	
the	Muslim	community	as	 legitimate	targets.	Following	the	events	 in	Norway	and	the	spate	of	
online	 hate	 against	 Muslims	 following	 Woolwich	 murder	 there	 is	 a	 danger	 that	 far	 right	
extremists	and	groups	will	 fall	under	 the	 radar	and	 the	 rise	of	 Islamophobia,	xenophobia	and	
racism	may	continue	unchecked.	
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